Organization & scope
Tenants, entities, sites, groups, reporting relationships, jurisdiction, timezone, ownership.
Modeling an entity does not establish legal, employment, or tax status.
Scope, permissions, versions, approvals, effective dates, worker visibility, integrations, emergency access, audit, and rollback. Administration is deny-by-default and attributable — and every material change is reversible without erasing what came before.

Scope invariant
This page explains the public control model and its safeguards. It is not a configuration console, and availability of any individual control remains evidence- and contract-gated.
Binding administrative limit
No screenshots, keystroke content, URL history, application-name monitoring, or clipboard collection under any tier or configuration.
The prohibition applies to native controls, add-ons, plan tiers, APIs, and product-managed integrations alike. There is no administrator role, no enterprise contract, and no configuration path that enables it — this is enforced in the product, not in policy.
Honest limitation: ZoikoTime cannot govern independent third-party systems outside its contract and technical control. What your organization does with data after it leaves the platform is outside this invariant's reach.
Administrative Control Domains
The boundary line matters as much as the purpose. A category label never proves a control is enabled for a specific customer.
Tenants, entities, sites, groups, reporting relationships, jurisdiction, timezone, ownership.
Modeling an entity does not establish legal, employment, or tax status.
Users, roles, service identities, authentication, permissions, delegation, access review.
Role names do not prove least privilege. Effective scope and evidence do.
Schedules, classifications, approvals, break and rest, attendance, exceptions, precedence.
Configuration is not legal advice or a compliance guarantee.
Source categories, mappings, field use, freshness, quality, retention, failure handling.
No prohibited surveillance data can be enabled here or anywhere.
Providers, service identities, scopes, mappings, write authority, health, revocation.
Connecting a provider does not establish availability or correctness.
Routing, eligibility, delegation, escalation, and required human review.
Automation does not make consequential decisions.
Applicable policy, source, status, correction, and escalation context.
Role- and policy-bound. Never exposes another worker's data.
Versions, approvals, access, changes, exceptions, rollback, reconciliation.
Audit evidence supports review. It is not an audit opinion.
Narrow break-glass, suspension, rollback, reconciliation, recovery pathways.
Emergency access cannot enable prohibited collection or erase history.
No hidden surveillance tier
The prohibited collection set is unavailable at every tier and configuration.
Deny by default
Absent an explicit current permission and scope intersection, the action is denied.
No silent inheritance
Inherited values, overrides, mandatory floors, and the effective result are all visible.
No silent overwrite
Material changes create versions. Prior approved state stays recoverable per retention policy.
No autonomous consequential outcome
Automation may route or classify under policy. Humans decide payroll, discipline, employment, legal.
No unscoped service identity
Every integration actor has a purpose, owner, scope, credential lifecycle, health, and revocation.
No permanent exception by neglect
Exceptions are time-bound or explicitly renewed. An expired exception stops or enters safe review.
No fabricated source health
Unavailable, stale, partial, or conflicting source state is visible and may block activation.
No hidden worker impact
Material changes affecting collection, classification, review, or visibility trigger governed communication.
No evidence-free claim
Every public control statement carries scope, status, owner, review date, limitations, and evidence route.
Scope, Inheritance & Precedence
An administrator should never have to guess why a setting resolved the way it did. Every layer that contributed is shown, including the one that blocked a local override.
| Layer | Contribution | Effect |
|---|---|---|
Global Organization default | Inherited baseline value for the control. | Applied |
Market / region Jurisdiction context | Regional variation where the product supports one. | Applied |
Mandatory floor Non-negotiable minimum | A security, privacy, or collection-limit requirement that cannot be weakened below this point. | Blocks override |
Entity Legal or operating entity | Entity-level override, permitted only above the floor. | Applied |
Site / group Local context | Local override attempted below the mandatory floor. | Rejected |
Exception Time-bound deviation | None active for this control. | Not applied |
Effective result What actually applies | Entity override, constrained by the mandatory floor. The rejected local override remains visible with its reason. | Resolved |
Local configuration cannot weaken a floor
A site or group override can never silently reduce a mandatory security or privacy control, and can never broaden collection beyond the prohibited set. A rejected override is shown as rejected — not quietly dropped.
Where sources are incompatible or incomplete, the change enters a conflict state and cannot activate. Administrators can preview which scopes and records a proposed change would affect before approving it.
Scope dimensions: tenant, legal or operating entity, business unit, site, team, worker population, role, jurisdiction, and timezone. Scope lifecycle states: created, active, suspended, merged, retired. Modeling an entity here does not determine its legal, employment, or tax status.
Roles, Approvals & Separation
Effective permission is computed, not assigned. The same role in two scopes yields two different results.
Every one must permit the action. Any single denial denies the whole.
Separation of duties
No self-approval where separation is required. Proposing, reviewing, approving, activating, and auditing are distinct authorities. There is no silent reassignment, and neither workflow automation nor Kairos can decide, approve, or activate an administrative change.
Administrative Change Lifecycle
| 01 | Draft Reason, owner, and intended scope recorded. | Proposer |
| 02 | Scope review Affected entities, groups, and populations confirmed. | Reviewer |
| 03 | Validation Conflicts, floors, and incomplete sources checked. | System |
| 04 | Simulation Impact preview on synthetic or minimized data. | Proposer & reviewer |
| 05 | Required approvals Eligible approvers, separated from the proposer. | Human only |
| 06 | Scheduled activation Effective date and timezone; staged by cohort where approved. | System, on schedule |
| 07 | Active monitoring Behavior, source health, and worker impact observed. | Operating owner |
| 08 | Correction or rollback Original change preserved; downstream reconciliation tracked. | Authorized human |
| 09 | Supersession or retirement Prior version linked, never deleted. | Governance |
A failed activation enters a safe recoverable state with partial effects visible — not a silent half-applied configuration. And rollback does not erase the original change, nor does it guarantee downstream reconciliation is complete; that is tracked separately.
Objective: make workforce-record rules versioned, previewable, and attributable.
Limitations: ZoikoTime does not provide legal advice and does not guarantee that configured rules satisfy your obligations. Configuration never produces an automatic payroll, disciplinary, or compliance decision.
Objective: ensure every non-human actor is scoped, owned, observable, and revocable.
Limitations: connecting a provider establishes neither availability nor correctness. A failed integration never broadens access to complete an exchange — it fails visibly and enters reconciliation.
Worker Transparency & Human Authority
Configuration decides how records are made. It does not decide whether the person described by a record can see it, question it, or have a human review it.
Visibility is role- and policy-bound and never exposes another worker's data. Consultation obligations remain your organization's — this page describes the product's communication mechanisms, not your legal duties.
Consequential outcomes stay human
Automated configuration may route or classify under policy, but payroll, discipline, employment, legal, and worker-rights outcomes require authorized human review outside automatic classification. Deterministic time classification is policy-bound and reviewable — and is not presented as AI.
Kairos may retrieve, summarize, and explain governed configuration data where approved. It cannot propose an approval, activate a change, alter a policy version, or hold administrative authority of any kind.
Human-in-Command ControlsExceptions & Emergency Administration
Emergency authority exists because incidents happen. It is deliberately narrow, expensive to use, and impossible to use quietly.
Objective: allow emergency action while making it fully attributable and self-limiting.
Hard limits: there is no standing unmonitored emergency account. Break-glass cannot enable prohibited collection, cannot produce an autonomous consequential decision, and cannot erase audit history — emergency action remains attributable permanently.
Objective: allow a documented deviation without letting it become permanent through inattention.
Limitations: an accepted exception is not equivalent to compliance and not equivalent to the control being met. It records that an eligible authority chose to accept a known gap, with an end date attached.
Control Evidence Directory
Planned or contract-specific controls are never described as universally current.
The deny-by-default intersection and how it is evaluated.
Limitation: describes the model, not your configured role assignments.
Source levels, mandatory floors, overrides, exceptions, and effective result.
Limitation: product precedence, not legal precedence.
Draft through retirement, with required gates and rollback behavior.
Limitation: rollback does not guarantee downstream reconciliation.
Authentication, scope, time limits, monitoring, revocation, and post-use review.
Access: governed request. Security-sensitive detail withheld.
Purpose, owner, scope, credential lifecycle, and revocation per integration actor.
Access: governed request. No customer service-account metadata is public.
Phased rollout of a configuration change by approved cohort or environment.
Not universally available. Eligibility is contract- and plan-dependent.
No internal control ID, tenant configuration, or security-sensitive implementation detail appears here. Withdrawn and superseded claims are excluded from current results and structured data, and search terms are never captured in analytics.
Controlled Administrative Controls Review
Availability of an individual control in your plan, region, deployment model, or integration set is contract-gated and cannot be published.
Direct Answers
No. No screenshots, keystroke content, URL history, application-name monitoring, or clipboard collection under any tier or configuration. No plan, add-on, API, administrator role, or enterprise contract creates that collection set — it is enforced in the product, not promised in policy.